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Abstract
Transitioning to a decarbonized economy is a crucial part of climate change mitigation, with the phasing-out of coal, as
the most significant source of carbon dioxide emissions, being the centerpiece of this effort. In the European context, the
increasing pressures exerted especially on the basis of the European Union’s energy and climate policy, coupledwith the in-
herent uncertainty of the transition process, encourage various struggles among the involved policy actors over the setting
of specific transition pathways. One site of such contestation is media discourse, whichmay facilitate or limit policy change
through agenda-setting, framing, and other processes. Importantly, discursive struggles also include industry incumbents,
who have a vested interest in preserving the existing sociotechnical regime. This article focuses on the position of incum-
bents in terms of their relationship with governing political parties and the discursive strategies they employ. It explores
the policy debate on coal mining expansion which took place in 2015 in the Czech Republic, a post-communist country
with a coal-dependent economy, a skeptical position on energy transition, and a powerful energy industry. The research
employs discourse network analysis to examine a corpus compiled from daily newspapers and applies block modeling
techniques to analyze patterns of relationships within and between actor groups. The results show that incumbents suc-
cessfully prevented policy change in the direction of rapid coal phase-out by exploiting discourse alignment with governing
parties and efficiently employing discursive strategies based primarily on securitization of socioeconomic issues.
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1. Introduction
Transition to a decarbonized economy is a crucial part of
climate change mitigation efforts. Coal, which has been
used as a reliable and cheap energy source since the
beginning of the industrial revolution, now accounts for
27% of global primary energy supplies, and its share in
total CO2 emissions is 44% (International Energy Agency,
2018). Thus, energy transition requires a rapid coal
phase-out. The European Union has devised a plan to
stop coal production over a horizon of 25 to 50 years
(European Commission, 2017), which generates pressure
especially on incumbent coal producers who resist and
negotiate such change (Geels, 2014). The nature and
pace of energy transition is thus contested by diverse
policy actors and their coalitions who compete to influ-
ence the related policy process (Markard, Suter, & Ingold,
2016; Ocelík et al., 2019).
Mass media are an integral part of this struggle
as they provide visible sites for policy debates on
transition-related challenges, thus defining for audiences
what are (non)legitimate policy responses and who au-
thoritatively speaks about them (Johnstone, Stirling, &
Sovacool, 2017; Stoddart & Tindall, 2015). Likewise,
Leifeld (2013) argues that policy actors’ media struggles
constitute a “discursive layer of subsystem politics” and
actors can be classified into “coalitions of competing
policy beliefs” through which they promote their inter-
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ests (see Hajer, 1995; Sabatier, 1988). Shanahan, Jones,
andMcBeth (2011) contend that coalitions generate and
strategically use particular narratives tailored to promote
preferred policy outcomes. Consequently, political dis-
courses affect agenda-setting processes, public opinion
dynamics, and policy actors’ interactions, and have the
potential to facilitate particular policy outcomes (Leifeld,
2017). More generally, a discursive shift where one dom-
inant coalition is replaced by another is considered a pre-
condition of major policy change (Hajer, 1993; Leifeld,
2013; Shanahan et al., 2011). Thus, the study of politi-
cal discourses is critical for better understanding energy
transitions requiring major policy changes.
In this research, we present a single-case study that
examines (1) whether energy industry incumbents, i.e.,
actors that benefit most from the prevailing system
(Smink, 2015), aligned with governing political parties,
and (2) what discursive strategies incumbents employed
to prevent policy outcomes from facilitating coal phase-
out (Johnstone et al., 2017). The case is one of a ma-
ture, adversarial policy subsystem (Weible, 2008) with
a well-established coalition structure consisting of two
competing coalitions (see Ocelík et al., 2019). Based
on the above, the overarching research question is
the following:
RQ: How did the position of incumbents in the media
discourse on coal phase-out evolve over the course of
the year 2015?
To that end, we use discourse network analysis (Leifeld &
Haunss, 2012), which allows us to capture actors’ discur-
sive interactions over time. We analyzed a media cover-
age corpus consisting of the relevant articles from daily
newspapers in the Czech Republic. To examine discourse
alignment between incumbents and governing parties,
we used deductive block modelling (Saunders, 2009).
This research strives to make two contributions.
Firstly, by linking policy process (Leifeld, 2016; Sabatier,
1988) and energy transition literatures (Geels, 2002;
Johnstone et al., 2017), it explores the role of incum-
bents in preventing transition-oriented policy change
through discursive interactions. Secondly, the research
brings novel empirical evidence on a major European
coal consumer which is neither committed to a specific
phase-out pathway (such as Germany), nor actively op-
posing that policy option (such as Poland; see Lehotský,
Černoch, Osička, & Ocelík, 2019; Osička et al., 2020).
2. Theory: A Discursive Layer of Energy Transition
Energy transition constitutes amajor technological trans-
formation in the way fundamental societal functions
are fulfilled, such as housing, transportation or feed-
ing (Geels, 2002). Such change is, nevertheless, limited
by path-dependencies of an established socio-technical
regime—a set of embedded rules and practices that en-
ables and constrains actors in relation to the existing en-
ergy system (Geels, 2014). Thus, the formulation of spe-
cific transition pathways assuming different cost and ben-
efit structures is being contested by diverse policy actors
and their coalitions (Markard et al., 2016). In this context,
we use the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (Sabatier,
1988), which posits that policy processes involving vari-
ous interdependent actors take place mostly within spe-
cific policy subsystems defined by particular issue ar-
eas. It further assumes that since actors cannot achieve
most of their goals alone, they tend to form ‘coalitions
of the like-minded’ centered around highly salient pol-
icy beliefs concerning how the policy subsystem should
be organized (Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2011). Energy-
related subsystems are expected to involve coalitions of
right-wing and industry organizations, with the princi-
ple actors being incumbents, vis-à-vis coalitions of left-
wing and environmental organizations, with the principle
actors being environmental NGOs (ENGOs; see Ingold,
Fischer, & Cairney, 2017; Ocelík et al., 2019). Industry in-
cumbents possess superior organizational resources and
privileged access to decision-making authorities (Geels,
2014). ENGOs, however, try to offset their lower organi-
zational resources and limited access to decision-making
through media visibility and other outsider strategies
(Dalton, Recchia, & Rohrschneider, 2003).
Weible (2008) proposed that coalition interactions
are conditioned by the subsystem characteristics, specif-
ically by the degree of policy belief compatibility and
prevailing coordination patterns. Adversarial subsystems
are then defined by competing coalitions with low-level
between-coalition belief compatibility (Weible, Pattison,
& Sabatier, 2010). Competing coalitions exercise power
against each other through different means, including
by shaping public opinion and thereby affecting the
decision-making of political authorities (Leifeld, 2016;
Weible et al., 2010). Media discourse is a key arena
where diverse actors engage in policy debates and
struggle to shape public understanding of contested is-
sues (Broadbent et al., 2016; Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, &
Broadbent, 2017; Leifeld, 2013). Thus, coalitions strive to
promote their narratives designed to convince other ac-
tors about a particular policy position (Shanahan et al.,
2011). To capture coalition dynamics at the discourse
level, we employ the concept of ‘discourse coalitions,’ de-
fined as “groups of actors who share a social construct”
(Hajer, 1993, p. 43).
To resist regime change, incumbents use instru-
mental, institutional, material, and discursive strategies
(Geels, 2014). Instrumental strategies employ various
actor-specific resources such as positions of author-
ity, money, or access to media in direct interactions
with other actors to pursue their interests. Lobbying
government to promote regime protection policies is
an example of this strategy. Institutional strategies are
based on resonance of incumbents’ actions and in-
terests with deeper ideological and governance struc-
tures that thereby assist in resistance to regime change.
Paternalistic decision-making dominated by technical
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and economic expertise, traditionally ‘owned’ by incum-
bents, is a component of such institutional context (see
Osička & Černoch, 2017). Material strategies then uti-
lize technical capabilities and financial resources tomain-
tain and improve the technical dimension of the cur-
rent socio-technical regime. For instance, investments
in carbon-intensive technologies reinforce technological
lock-in and path-dependencies, which in turn structurally
condition policy choices. Geels (2014) gives the exam-
ple of carbon capture and storage technology, which has
also significantly contributed to a ‘clean coal’ discourse.
Finally, discursive strategies focus on shaping public dis-
courses in order to establish a regime-protective dom-
inant discourse. This allows incumbents to control the
complementary processes of agenda-setting (McCombs
& Shaw, 1972), i.e., what is discussed, and framing (Snow
& Benford, 1988), i.e., how is it discussed.
Johnstone et al. (2017) offer a useful typology of ‘in-
cumbents’ strategies’ that allows to further distinguish
the specific ways they shape public and policy discourses
to secure their interests. First, ‘securitization’ frames the
incumbents’ interests, such as expansion of coal mining,
as matters of national or regional security. Appeals to
supply security that contrast coal as a reliable domes-
tic source to import dependency-inducing natural gas or
volatile renewables would be consistent with such strat-
egy. Second, ‘reinvention’ reframes the current regime
and its core components in a way that appears new
or innovative. So-called clean coal technologies are a
prime example here. Third, ‘masking’ suppresses, social-
izes or externalizes the full costs of the incumbent regime.
For example, incumbents typically choose to be silent
on issues of the environmental degradation and health
impacts of coal mining. Fourth, ‘capture’ promotes in-
cumbents into positions of political or regulatory power.
In this respect, the ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon blurs
distinctions between public and private interests,making
it unclear who speaks for whom (Johnstone et al., 2017).
3. Data and Methods
The analyzed corpus consists of all articles concerned
with the topic in the major national newspapers which
satisfy the ‘quality press’ criterion (Leifeld, 2013) as well
as regional newspapers in the impacted regions: Karlovy
Vary, Liberec, Plzeň, andÚstí nad Labem. Specifically, this
included all four major daily newspapers Mladá fronta
Dnes, Právo, Lidové noviny, and Hospodářské noviny, pe-
ripheral Haló noviny (closely linked to the Communist
Party); and 11 regional newspapers (Deník) issued un-
der Vltava Labe Press publishing house. The editorial
ideology of the major national newspapers ranges from
the traditional social-democratic perspective of Právo,
through Mladá fronta Dnes’ centrist position, to the lib-
eral right in the case of Lidové noviny and Hospodářské
noviny (for more, see Volek & Urbániková, 2017). It is
worth noting that then chairman of junior governing
party ANO 2011 and Finance Minister Andrej Babiš ac-
quired the MAFRA publishing house that issues Lidové
noviny andMladá fronta Dnes.
Data was collected through the Anopress IT Czech
media monitoring database (Anopress, n.d.) based on
the following keyword search query (English/Czech key-
word): coal/uhlí <AND> ((mining/těžba <AND> lim-
its/limity) <OR> energy industry/energetika <OR> lim-
its/limity). The query construction avoids too narrow fo-
cus by adding keyword phrase energy industry, which
allows us to capture incumbents’ discursive strategies
that do not explicitly mention the mining limits—such as
statements on the role of coal in the energymix. The time
frame was set between 1 January 2015 and 21 October
2015 to cover the policy debate on the mining limits be-
tween the government’s announcement of the reevalua-
tion process and its final decision.
All articles were read and their contents manually
coded if actor statements (1) referred to relevant policy
positions or responses (e.g., ‘mining limits need to be
preserved’) or (2) represented normative evaluations of
relevant issues (e.g., ‘coalmining has severe environmen-
tal impacts’; Koopmans, 2002). Both direct and indirect
(reported) statements have been coded. The coding was
done in Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld, 2019). Each
coding unit (statement) was defined by four variables:
concept, organization, person (if available/relevant), and
dis/agreement with the concept. Although coding allow-
ing to test inter-coder reliability was not applied, we
used the following procedure to increase data quality.
Firstly, an initial coding scheme consisting of a smaller
number of concepts derived from literature was formu-
lated. Secondly, a multipass coding strategy where a sin-
gle coder navigates back and forth between the state-
ments in order to increase coding consistency was em-
ployed (Leifeld, 2013). There was a first reading of the
corpus followed by regular meetings with the second re-
searcher during which ambiguities in the coding were ad-
dressed and resolved. This included revisions of the cod-
ing scheme to reflect new information. Lastly, there was
a joint discussion on classification of the concepts under
the incumbents’ discursive strategies (see Table 1).
The coding of 705 relevant articles yielded 890
coding units with 34 concepts and 43 organizational
actors (for more information, see Appendix 3 of the
Supplementary File). The actors were classified un-
der four categories: (1) incumbents, (2) governing par-
ties, (3) ENGOs, and (4) none of the above (residual
group). This classification reflects the focus on the re-
lationship between the incumbents and governing par-
ties while controlling for the main regime challengers,
ENGOs. Governing parties were Social Democrats, ANO
2011, and Christian Democrats. Incumbents were de-
fined as organizations that mostly benefit from the cur-
rent regime (see Smink, 2015) and would directly profit
from the mining expansion. Preserving the limits, to
the contrary, would incur costs to them. The incum-
bents include state-owned energy company ČEZ Group
and its subsidiary North Bohemian Mines, private min-
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Table 1. Incumbents’ discursive strategies: Classification scheme.
Strategies Concepts
Capture The state should be involved in coal mining (agreement)
Masking Coal mining has no negative impacts if it does not interfere with settlements (agreement)
Moving the mining further away from settlements sufficiently reduces its negative impacts (agreement)
Coal mining and use of coal have negative health impacts (disagreement)
Coal mining produces high negative externalities (disagreement)
Rescission of limits will cause environmental degradation (disagreement)
Reinvention The combination of underground and surface mining is less harmful (agreement)
Coal is a key source for the heating industry (agreement)
Securitization Preserving the limits will bring regional socioeconomic decline (agreement)
Preserving the limits will cause serious regional unemployment (agreement)
Coal is a strategic commodity (agreement)
Coal is needed to replace power supplies from the nuclear-power plant Dukovany (agreement)
According to the State Energy Policy coal beyond the limits in the ČSA mine is not needed (disagreement)
ing companies Sev.en and Sokolov Coal, as well as the
Bohemian–Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions and
the Heating Industry Association. Regime challengers,
on the other hand, aim to disrupt and change the sta-
tus quo. Nevertheless, only ENGOs have been included
since countervailing industry actors, such as renewable
energy companies, did not engage in the debate. The
ENGOs group includes Friends of the Earth, Glopolis,
Greenpeace, and Limits Are Us. Finally, though local or-
ganizations, mostly municipalities and civil associations,
do not necessarily pursue regime change, some are con-
cerned with the immediate impacts of mining expansion,
such as destruction of settlements. Hence, the residual
group consists of a heterogeneous set of actors such as
opposition and regional political parties, research organi-
zations, local civic organizations, and other NGOs.
The incumbents’ discursive strategieswere identified
based on the subsequent theory-driven classification of
particular concepts into four categories: capture, mask-
ing, reinvention, and securitization (Johnstone et al.,
2017). We used a classification scheme consisting of 13
concepts capturing specific features of the four strate-
gies (see Table 1). The remaining 21 concepts have not
been explicitly linked to any of the strategies. Thus, occur-
rence of dis/agreements with particular concepts or the
absence of agreement with particular concepts (mask-
ing) indicated use of a specific discursive strategy.
We extracted matrices for (1) actor congruence net-
works consisting of organizations and (2) bipartite (af-
filiation) networks consisting of organizations and con-
cepts for all three stages. The actor congruence net-
works have weighted ties that represent organizations’
cumulative similarity in their use of concepts. Thus, the
more similar the position in the discourse, the higher
the edge weight. We further used average activity nor-
malization (Leifeld, 2013), which accounts for the pres-
ence of highly involved actors such as relevant min-
istries. More specifically, the edge weight is normalized
by dividing its value by the average number of concepts
both actors refer to, either through negative or positive
statements, in the affiliation network. The threshold val-
ues for dichotomization were set in an explorative way
(Leifeld, 2013). Normalized actor congruence networks
were used to explore the coalition structure of discourse.
We defined discourse coalitions as groups or organiza-
tions that (1) exclusively agreed or disagreed with one of
the four limit rescission variants and (2) have been identi-
fied as part of a cohesive subgroup (formore information,
see Appendix 2 of the Supplementary File).
The affiliation networks have weighted ties result-
ing from subtraction of disagreements from agreements
(see Leifeld, Gruber, & Bossner, 2019). The next step was
to dichotomize the underlying incidence matrices. Since
we are interested in similarity patterns among organiza-
tions, we used the following threshold: if w > 0, then 1,
otherwise 0. In other words, all positive ties were trans-
formed to 1s and all negative ties were transformed to 0s.
There are two reasons for such approach. First, we argue
that more restrictive thresholds are appropriate rather
for one-mode projections that tend to overestimate den-
sity and clustering than for bipartite networks. Second,
a more restrictive threshold would also discard patterns
of ties where actors express a low-level agreement (e.g.,
w= 1) with a large number of concepts resulting in a loss
of potentially important information.
The resulting incidence matrices were used to cal-
culate of row-based (organization-based) square similar-
ity matrices using Jaccard’s coefficient (Hahsler, 2019).
Jaccard’s coefficient (J) calculates the similarity of two
sets (here organization profiles) as the number of com-
mon elements (intersection of the two sets) divided by
the sum of the number of elements in both sets (union
of the two sets). Thus, J ranges between < 0, 1 > and
can be readily interpreted as the percentage of overlap
between the two sets, with 0 indicating no overlap and
1 complete overlap.
To examine a discourse alignment between incum-
bents and governing parties, we used deductive block
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 272–285 275
modelling. A block model is a simplified representation
of a network that consists of groups of nodes (blocks)
that have similar relations to others and similar pat-
terns of relations among nodes and blocks (social roles;
see White, Boorman, & Breiger, 1976). Deductive block
modelling then involves the definition of a hypothetical
model based on theoretical assumptions (see Saunders,
2009)—here, similarity of governing parties and incum-
bents in terms of used concepts—which provides a base-
line for the observed network. Thus, each block model
divided the corresponding similarity matrix into four
groups based on organization membership in (1) incum-
bents, (2) governing parties, (3) ENGOs, and (4) none
of the above (residual group). The resulting 4 × 4 im-
age matrix represents the average similarity values for
the within-group blocks (diagonal) and between-group
blocks (non-diagonal). Thus, similarity (discourse align-
ment) between the two actor groups, such as incum-
bents and governing parties, is indicated if the corre-
sponding between-group block average similarity value
is statistically significantly higher than the overall aver-
age (network) similarity.
In order to determinewhether the observed block av-
erages statistically significantly differ from the network
(overall) average, we used a permutation test. More
specifically, statistical significance was assessed based
on a comparison of the observed block similarities with
the interval estimate of the overall average (network)
similarity constructed for the 95% confidence level from
a generated sampling distribution with 5,000 trials. The
sampling distribution was generated based on Jaccard’s
coefficient measurements of the 5,000 random bipartite
networks with the same number of nodes in both node
sets and with a tie formation probability set to the den-
sity calculated for the dichotomized incidence matrix of
the observed network.
We used R 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2014) for data process-
ing and analysis, specifically the packages arules (Hahsler,
2019), rDNA (Leifeld, Gruber, & Henrichsen, 2019), and
sna (Butts, 2008).
4. Results
The debate on the mining limits’ rescission proceeded
in three stages. More specifically, the decision to review
the territorial limits (see Figure 1) was part of a coalition
agreement establishing the new government in early
2014 (first stage). The majority government was led by
the Social Democrats and included two junior coalition
partners, technocratic populist ANO 2011 and Christian
Democrats. Having analyzed the situation, at the end of
2014 theMinistry of Industry and Trade proposed the fol-
lowing four potential options:
1. To preserve the current territorial limits;
2. To rescind the limits in the Bílina mine;
3. To rescind the limits in the Bílinamine and partially
also in the ČSA mine;
4. To rescind the limits in the Bílina mine and also in
the ČSA mine.
Figure 1. Territorial-ecological limits and mining sites in the North Bohemian (Most) Basin. Source: Adopted from Lehotský
et al. (2019).
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Initially, rescission of the limits was supported mainly by
industry incumbents and the Minister for Industry and
Trade. This, however, stirred a substantial public debate,
and at the beginning of 2015 the two junior coalition par-
ties decided to oppose the change. To resolve this stale-
mate, it was agreed that further analyses would bemade
to better understand the consequences of each option,
towhich end the government commissioned impact eval-
uation studies (second stage).
In May 2015, an important amendment of the State
Energy Policy envisaging a shift in the energy mix from
coal-based production to a greater role of nuclear en-
ergy was adopted (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2015).
Subsequently, the impact evaluation studies published
at the turn of August and September (third stage) ar-
gued that only the coal reserves in the Bílina mine were
needed to cover future coal demand. After these devel-
opments, the junior coalition partners changed their po-
sition, and on 19 October 2015, the government reached
the decision to rescind the territorial limits in the Bílina
mine (option 2). For more information, see Appendix 1
of the Supplementary File.
This section presents a description of the normalized
actor congruence networks and block modelling results
for each stage. The former represents organizations’ be-
lief overlap andmaps coalition structure of the discourse
(Leifeld, 2013), while the latter shows organizations’ sim-
ilarities within and across four pre-defined groups: in-
cumbents, governing parties, ENGOs, and residual group.
A summary of incumbents’ discursive strategies is pre-
sented in Section 4.4.
4.1. First Stage (January–April 2015): Incumbent
Mobilization
The government’s announcement of the mining limits’
reevaluation in early January 2015 sparked a heated
debate. The actor congruence network (Figure 2) con-
tains the largest number of actors (39) while exhibiting
a marked segmentation into two competing coalitions.
The industry coalition (N = 18), led by incumbent ac-
tors Sev.en (privatemining company) and the Bohemian–
Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (BMCTU), is or-
ganizationally heterogeneous and, importantly, also in-
cludes the Social Democrats (SD), which occupied the
Ministry of Industry and Trade as well as the Prime
Minister’s Office. Another notable actor is the President
of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman (Pre), a long-term
supporter of industry incumbents. Two regional political
parties belong to the coalition as well, the Communist
Party (CP) and populist party Dawn of Direct Democracy
(DDD). Having traditional ties to the coal mining regions,
the Social Democrats are by far the most active, with
106 statements, while the private coal mining company
Sev.en ranks second with 55 statements. The industry
coalition emphasizes socioeconomic benefits of mining
expansion, especially in terms of job security, mining roy-
alty incomes, and regional development.
The environmental coalition (N = 14) consists of
ENGOs, grassroots organizations, local municipalities, re-
search organizations, the Green Party, and four local or-
ganizations of political parties. The local Green Party or-
ganization in Horní Jiřetín (GP-J), a municipality at risk
Figure 2. Normalized actor congruence network (w > 0.727). Notes: Incumbents are coded as red, governing parties as
blue, ENGOs as green, and residual actors as pink. Isolates are not displayed.
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of destruction in more extensive variants of the limits’
rescission, is the most active with 17 statements. The
coalition promotes counter-arguments based primarily
on negative environmental and health impacts, other
concepts are represented only marginally.
The other two governing parties, the Christian
Democrats (CD) and ANO 2011 (ANO), for which the min-
ing limits represent a less important issue, are positioned
between the two coalitions. Both parties acknowledge
arguments concerning socioeconomic benefits as well as
negative environmental and health impacts.
The blocked actor Jaccard’s similarity matrix (see
Table 2) shows a statistically significantly higher similar-
ity between the incumbents and the governing parties
(block 1–2) as well as between the governing parties
and ENGOs (2–3). To the contrary, the between-group
block 1–3 involving the incumbents and the ENGOs ex-
hibits statistically significantly lower similarity approach-
ing a zero-belief overlap. Except the block 3–4, all other
between-group blocks are not statistically significantly
different from the overall average (J = 0.092). Lastly,
all within-group similarity values are statistically signifi-
cantly higher indicating relative cohesiveness of the four
actor groups. These results provide supportive evidence
for the presence of two discourse coalitions with a low
belief overlap led by the incumbents and ENGOs. They
further show that incumbents alignedwith the governing
parties already in the initial stage of the policy debate.
4.2. Second Stage (May–August 2015): Incumbent
Retreat
The second stage, marked by the amendment of the
State Energy Policy in May 2015 (Ministry of Industry
and Trade, 2015), shows a very different picture where
only the most active of actors remain present. In com-
parison to the previous stage, the actor congruence net-
work (Figure 3) is less segmented and contains only 17 ac-
tors. The governing parties (Social Democrats and ANO
2011) remained centrally located and bridged between
the incumbents and a cluster of environmental and lo-
cal actors.
The industry coalition (N = 5) includes only one in-
cumbent actor (the Bohemian–Moravian Confederation
of Trade Unions, BMCTU); three political parties
(Social Democrats [SD], a regional organization of the
Communist Party, Ústecký [CP-U], and a local organi-
zation of ANO 2011 [ANO-B]); and the municipality of
Mariánské Radčice (MR). Interestingly, the remaining
incumbent actors, i.e., the mining companies North
BohemianMines (NBM) and Sev.en, have not been vocal
in terms of public support of the rescission. This could
be interpreted in a way that they preferred rather in-
strumental strategies since the final decision was made
at the governmental level. As in the previous stage, the
group articulated issues referring mostly to the negative
socioeconomic impacts resulting from preservation of
the limits, especially those of regional unemployment
and supply shortages in the heating sector.
The environmental coalition (N= 5) consists of ENGO
Limits Are Us (LU), the Green Party (GP), the regional po-
litical party North Bohemians (NB), the local Green Party
organization in Horní Jiřetín (GP-J), and the municipality
of Litvínov (Lit). The Limits Are Us organization was es-
tablished directly in response to the governmental pro-
posal to rescind the mining limits and soon started a
public campaign based mostly on direct action. Thus, its
repertoire of contention differs from longer-established
ENGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth,
who rely more on media campaigns and advocacy. The
absence of these organizations is rather surprising and
indicates their reactive position in the debate. The coali-
tion maintained its focus on local environmental and
health impacts of coal mining.
The governing party ANO 2011 remains in a bridging
position between the two coalitions, while the Christian
Democrats are not present. This might be related to the
fact that the Christian Democrats’ electoral base in the
concerned regions is weak.
The blocked actor Jaccard’s similarity matrix (see
Table 3) showed a markedly different pattern in compar-
ison to the previous stage. The results indicate that the
discourse alignment between the incumbents and gov-
erning parties (block 1–2) has not been stable over time
and incumbents might have chosen to avoid confronta-
tion in media. It should be noted that, the different vari-
ants of the limits’ rescission (see Section 3) would have
substantially different implications for the individual in-
cumbents. For instance, the partial rescission in vari-
ant 2 was beneficial for the state-owned ČEZ Group but
would keep the limits in place at the ČSA mine, owned
by the private company Sev.en. Thus, the incumbents’
positions became fragmented, as the statistically signif-
icantly lower similarity value of their within-block (1–1)
shows (overall average J = 0.129). The ENGOs have not
been successful to shift the views of ANO 2011 or the
Table 2. Block model: Reduced Jaccard’s similarity matrix (January–April 2015).
1. Incumbents 2. Governing parties 3. ENGOs 4. Residual group
1. Incumbents 0.168
2. Governing parties 0.132 0.290
3. ENGOs 0.008 0.104 0.181
4. Residual group 0.082 0.104 0.159 0.166
Notes: The cells represent Jaccard’s similarity values for the corresponding blocks. The cell values statistically significant at p< 0.05 level
are in bold.
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Figure 3. Normalized actor congruence network (w > 0.439). Notes: Incumbents are coded as red, governing parties as
blue, ENGOs as green, and residual actors as pink. Isolates are not displayed.
Christian Democrats in their favor, and thus have moved
to a peripheral position.
4.3. Third Stage (September–October 2015): Incumbent
Dominance
The publication of the impact studies at the turn of
August and September 2015 revived the debate as ac-
tors began commenting on its conclusions and recom-
mendations until the government’s final decision on 19
October 2015. The actor congruence network (Figure 4)
contains 25 actors who are, similarly as in the first stage,
segmented into two competing coalitions.
The industry coalition (N= 12) now consists of two
out of the three governing parties (Social Democrats and
Christian Democrats) as well as incumbent actors, specif-
ically state-owned energy utility ČEZ Group, Heating
Industry Association, and the Bohemian–Moravian
Confederation of Trade Unions. The group further in-
cludes Czech president Miloš Zeman (Pre), as well as the
Communist Party both at the national and regional level
(CP-U), a chamber of commerce (CC), a regional author-
ity (ESC-M) and two municipalities (Mariánské Radčice
[MR] and Most). The coalition maintains its socioeco-
nomic development narrative while highlighting the ar-
gument that mining expansion is necessary for securing
Table 3. Block model: Reduced Jaccard’s similarity matrix (May–August 2015).
1. Incumbents 2. Governing parties 3. ENGOs 4. Residual group
1. Incumbents 0.056
2. Governing parties 0.106 0.200
3. ENGOs 0.000 0.111 0.000
4. Residual group 0.031 0.089 0.210 0.124
Notes: The cells represent Jaccard’s similarity values for the corresponding blocks. The cell values statistically significant at p< 0.05 level
are in bold.
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Figure 4. Normalized actor congruence network: Third stage (w > 0.5). Notes: Incumbents are coded as red, governing
parties as blue, ENGOs as green, and a residual group as pink. Isolates are not displayed.
heat supplies. Further, it is emphasized that the planned
expansion will not lead to removal of settlements which
implies preserving the limits at the ČSA mine owned
by Sev.en.
The environmental coalition (N = 6) consists of two
ENGOs (Greenpeace [GPCZ] and Limits Are Us [LU]),
the Green Party at both the national and local levels
(GP-J), the liberal party TOP09, and Charles University
Environment Centre (CUEC). The coalition re-affirms
the negative environmental and health impacts of min-
ing expansion and newly emphasizes the issue of roy-
alty rate increases to account for the coal mining-
related externalities.
The blocked actor Jaccard’s similarity matrix (see
Table 4) shows a similar picture as in the first stage.
Importantly, the discourse alignment between the in-
cumbents and governing parties (governing parties) was
renewed (block 1–2). Likewise, the ENGOs and residual
group block exhibits a statistically significantly higher
similarity from the overall average (J = 0.108). In contrast
to the previous stages, the similarity between ENGOs
and governing parties is statistically significantly lower.
The same applies to all remaining between-group blocks,
which suggests increased segmentation of the discourse.
The within-group similarities are above the overall av-
erage for the governing parties and ENGOs. This shows
that the ENGOs’ reconsolidation coupled with the newly
introduced socioeconomic issue of royalty rates was in-
sufficient to influence the debate and was rather a re-
sponse to the expected outcome of a partial rescis-
sion. The incumbent group, consistently supported by
the Social Democrats, therefore succeeded in aligning
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Table 4. Block model: Reduced Jaccard’s similarity matrix (September–October 2015).
1. Incumbents 2. Governing parties 3. ENGOs 4. Residual group
1. Incumbents 0.126
2. Governing parties 0.155 0.304
3. ENGOs 0.000 0.072 0.250
4. Residual group 0.069 0.069 0.130 0.096
Notes: The cells represent Jaccard’s similarity values for the corresponding blocks. The cell values statistically significant at p< 0.05 level
are in bold.
the remaining two governing parties to their side, al-
though ANO 2011 did not explicitly agree with the limits’
rescission, and consistently promoted a socioeconomi-
cally based narrative.
4.4. Incumbents’ Discursive Strategies
When linking the distribution of concepts to the four dis-
cursive strategies (Johnstone et al., 2017), securitization
is the most present (see Figure 5). This strategy is based
mostly on socioeconomic arguments (27% of the incum-
bents’ total). More specifically, incumbents emphasize
job security (14%) and general socioeconomic decline
(12%) which is not surprising since the concerned region
is the poorest in the Czech Republic. However, framing
coal as a strategic commodity that prevents import de-
pendency and as a reliable source of electricity that, in
contrast to renewables, stabilizes the supply grid is only
marginally present (1%). Securitization appeals related to
the foreseen phase-out of nuclear power plant Dukovany
and the updated State Energy Policy which envisages a
declining role for coal in energy mix are absent.
Masking was marginally present through the argu-
ment that the removal of settlements is the most se-
rious obstacle to potential mining expansion (2%). Not
surprisingly, this concept is used by the company North
BohemianMines, which operates the Bílina mine, where
the limits’ rescission does not imply settlement removal,
contrary to the ČSAmine owned by Sev.en. Nevertheless,
masking can also be seen as the absence of concepts re-
ferring to environmental, health, and other negative im-
pacts of coal mining and use. Of the 73 total statements
referring to these concepts, incumbents made only 3 of




















Figure 5. Frequencies of incumbents’ discursive strategies.
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few direct disagreements with these concepts (3 out of
197 incumbent statements), which indicates that incum-
bents decided not to engage in direct confrontation with
the environmental coalition.
Reinvention is present mainly through portrayals of
coal as a vital source of heating supplies (7%). Although
such use of coal is not innovative, by shifting the empha-
sis from electricity generation to heating supplies, incum-
bents have ‘re-invented’ the critical importance of coal
for the future energy mix. Importantly, this argument
was later declared by the government as a key reason for
rescinding the limits at the Bílina mine. As another exam-
ple, the method of combined surface and underground
mining being described as less harmful in terms of local
impacts is marginally present (1%).
Capture can be explicitly linked only with the promo-
tion of the state’s direct involvement in coal mining as
articulated by private company Sev.en (3%). Sev.en pro-
poses a joint venture project with the state as a share-
holder and argues that such arrangement would ensure
efficient as well as fair cost–benefit distribution of the
mining expansion. It is important to add that the com-
pany North BohemianMines is owned by another incum-
bent actor, ČEZ Group, whosemajority shareholder is the
Czech government. Thus, Sev.en attempted to follow a
modelwhichwould decrease its control over the reserves
but ensure continuation of mining at the ČSA mine.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This article analyzed the evolution of the Czech media
discourse on coal in 2015—the year the government de-
cided to partially rescind the coal mining limits, thereby
substantially postponing the coal phase-out. The two re-
search objectives were followed. First, we examined dis-
course alignment between incumbent actors and govern-
ing parties (Geels, 2014; Smink, 2015) within the context
of an adversarial subsystem (Ocelík et al., 2019; Weible,
2008). As expected in energy-related subsystems (Ingold
et al., 2017), we identified two antagonistic coalitions,
a dominant industry coalition led by incumbents and a
minor environmental coalition led by ENGOs. The dis-
course alignment was reinforced even before the deci-
sion on themining limits, which was favorable tomost of
the incumbents, was made. Second, we explored the dis-
cursive strategies used by incumbents (Johnstone et al.,
2017), mostly relying on securitization appeals emphasiz-
ing job security and economic decline arguments.
The discourse alignment between incumbents and
governing parties varied across the three stages. In the
first stage, the socioeconomic narrative formulated by in-
cumbents resonatedwell with the Social Democrats’ poli-
cies and mobilized support of the allied, mostly regional,
actors. This is consistent with Smink’s (2015) argument
that incumbents tend to refer to general issues which
are only indirectly linked to their interests. In the sec-
ond stage, following the amendment of the State Energy
Policy, the alignment between incumbents and govern-
ing parties vanished. We offer two explanations here.
First, it could be due to incumbents’ move toward in-
strumental strategies (Geels, 2014) based mostly on lob-
bying and advocacy activities (see Ocelík et al., 2019).
The efforts of the most active incumbent, Sev.en, to es-
tablish a joint venture with state participation, as well
as its proposal to buy out properties that would be re-
moved if more extensive variants of the limits’ rescission
were adopted, provide supportive evidence (cf. Vlček
et al., 2019). Second, since the government declared it
would decide based on the results of impact studies,
the discourse as such shrunk and policy actors awaited
the studies’ publication in order to consider their re-
sults before formulating their subsequent strategies. In
the third stage, two out of the three governing parties
joined the industry coalition, thus securing its dominant
position before the government’s decision. This was fa-
cilitated by the inferior position of the environmental
coalition, which was unable to expand to include new
members thatwould challenge the status quo (Shanahan
et al., 2011).
As for discursive strategies, our findings show that in-
cumbents skillfully employed a mix of strategies, consist-
ing mostly of securitization complemented by reinven-
tion and masking (Johnstone et al., 2017). Incumbents
highlighted the risks of increased unemployment and re-
gional economic decline (securitization) while emphasiz-
ing the vital role of coal for heating supplies (reinvention)
and concealing the negative externalities of coal min-
ing (masking). Rather surprisingly, securitization based
on the expected increase of import dependency due to
coal phase-out was only marginally present (cf. Lehotský
et al., 2019). This is a striking difference from Polish
discourse where coal is seen as a material guarantee
of energy sovereignty and security of energy supplies
(Osička et al., 2020). Although capture, a blurring of
public and private interests, was also only marginally
represented, we argue that the long-term partnership
between the Social Democrats, which controlled the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, and incumbents, espe-
cially the ČEZ Group, supports the interpretation that
such arrangement was already in place (see Osička &
Černoch, 2017). Moreover, Lehotský et al. (2019) docu-
mented that over the long term, the Czech media dis-
course has emphasized the economic problems of min-
ing companies rather than environmental or other nega-
tive impacts as a public issue.
As a result, incumbents successfully established “a
winner’s tale” (Shanahan et al., 2011), i.e., a coherent
and persuasive narrative which, as Smink (2015) argued,
provides much wanted order in complex situations. Such
narrative diffuses benefits, in this case framed as re-
gional development, and concentrates costs, minor im-
pacts on local communities, to portray the status quo,
i.e., continuation of mining, as positive (Baumgartner &
Jones, 1993; Shanahan et al., 2011). As Shanahan et al.
(2011) argue, coalitions with coherent narratives more
likely influence policy outcomes. Likewise, Leifeld and
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Haunss (2012) posit that successful coalitions are stable
over time in terms of both their core actors and frames
integrated into a consistent story line.
We argue there are three major policy implications.
First, regime challengers need to create coherent narra-
tive(s) that do not rely only on particular issues but pro-
vide an alternative vision for the subsystem and, more
generally, future regime organization that is appealing
also to wider audiences. This requires coordination at
the coalition level (see Schmidt, 2008), as well as efforts
to involve key actors, such as policy-makers and regional
authorities, in constructing the regime-challenging narra-
tives. Narratives promoted by incumbents should be ex-
plicitly and persistently confronted, in order to increase
overall polarization of the debate (Černoch, Lehotský,
Ocelík, Osička, & Vencourová, 2019), potentially con-
tributing to the disintegration or weakening of the domi-
nant incumbent-led coalition (see Leifeld, 2013). Second,
a regime-challenging coalition needs to be inclusive. It
should consist not only of usual suspects such as envi-
ronmental movement actors led by professional ENGOs
and countervailing industries, but also research organi-
zations, providing scientific expertise, as well as regional
and local actors from transition-affected areas, provid-
ing legitimacy. Thus, a participatory mode of activism
(Petrova&Tarrow, 2007) should be utilized due to its high
mobilization and advocacy capacities, which are critical
for coalition expansion. Third, better understanding of
how incumbents engage in discursive struggles is useful
not only to challengers but also to policy-makers, which
are expected to occupy a brokerage position and facil-
itate between-coalition policy learning (Leifeld, 2013).
This further implies that policy-makers should systemati-
cally obtain and consider inputs and policy proposals also
from minor coalitions (see Smink, 2015). The establish-
ment of policy venues (Fischer & Leifeld, 2015) to facili-
tate this process is an advisable step.
This research of course has certain limitations to be
addressed. First, it is a single case study focused primarily
on novel empirical evidence, which implies limited gen-
eralizability of the results. Moreover, the study omits in-
cumbents’ non-discursive strategies. Second, it uses de-
scriptive and exploratorymethods for coalition detection
and discursive strategies analysis, which limits the evalu-
ation of uncertainty.
Considering the above, there appear to be two
promising directions for future research. First, applica-
tion of inferential methods to coalition detection would
be a logical next step. Second, expanding the research
scope to non-discursive incumbent strategies that could
also be integrated into a comparative framework seems
especially promising.
To conclude, this study examined the role of incum-
bent actors in the Czech media discourse on coal within
the context of an adversarial subsystem. The results
showed that incumbents successfully prevented policy
change to rapid coal phase-out pursued by the envi-
ronmental coalition through a discourse alignment with
governing parties and efficient use of discursive strate-
gies. The industry coalition’s dominant position was fur-
ther strengthened by two other factors. First, the combi-
nation of the incumbents’ strategy to avoid direct con-
frontation with opponents and the inferior position of
the environmental coalition, which did not challenge
incumbents’ socioeconomic narrative, contributed to a
lower level of discourse polarization. Second, the adver-
sarial nature of the subsystem (Ocelík et al., 2019) lim-
ited the potential for between-coalition learning, which
could have eroded the industry coalition’s dominant posi-
tion by shifting some of its members to the environmen-
tal coalition as early adopters (see Leifeld, 2013). As a
result, the overall coalition structure remained relatively
stable (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012), and the policy outcome,
i.e., limited mining limits rescission, ensured the contin-
uation of the status quo within the subsystem.
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